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Abstract. We speculate whether the second law of thermodynamics has
more to do with Turing machines than steam pipes. It states the logical
reversibility of reality as a computation, i.e., the fact that no information
is forgotten: nature computes with Toffoli-, not NAND gates. On the way
there, we correct Landauer’s erasure principle by directly linking it to
lossless data compression, and we further develop that to a lower bound
on the energy consumption and heat dissipation of a general computation.
1 Prologue
A few years ago, our group had the great pleasure and privilege to receive
Juraj Hromkovič as a guest in Ticino. He had announced a discourse on the
topic “What is information?”. It was a fascinating lecture in which Juraj was
advocating to view information as complexity. This has been inspiring for me,
and it is probably not a coïncidence that soon after that, I realized that the use of
Kolmogorov complexity [17]1 instead of probability distributions in the context of
the fascinating but strange “non-local” correlations that quantum physics comes
with — and that had been my main object of study for over a decade already
at that time — offers a significant conceptual advantage: Non-counterfactuality,
i.e., no necessity to talk about the outcomes of unperformed experiments.
John Stewart Bell showed in 1964 [6] that quantum theory predicts correlations
between measurement outcomes that are too strong to be explained by shared
classical information. This is as if identical twins did not only look alike — such
correlations can easily be explained with their identical DNA sequences and do
not confront us with a “metaphysical” problem — but also behaved in a ways so
strongly correlated that genetic explanations fail. Bell’s result was a late reply
to an attack to quantum theory by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (“EPR”)
in 1935 [11] who remarked that if the outcomes of measurements on quantum
systems are correlated, then they cannot be spontaneously random as predicted
by the theory, but they must already have been determined beforehand, at the
occasion of the creation of the entangled pair. To stay with our analogy: If twins
1 The Kolmogorov complexity KU (x) of a string x with respect to a universal Turing
machine U is the length of the shortest program for U that outputs x. The conditional
complexity of x given y, KU (x|y), is the length of the shortest program outputting x
upon input y. The quantities depend on the choice of the specific machine U only
through an additive constant.
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2 Stefan Wolf
look the same, their looks must be determined by their genes; if they also behave
the same, then so must their behaviour. This is a natural thought — but it is
insufficient, and to realize this is Bell’s breakthrough: “Genetic” explanations are
too weak for quantum correlations. But then, where do they come from? What
mechanism establishes them?
The basis of EPR’s argument has later been called “Reichenbach’s princi-
ple” [21]: A correlation in a causal structure is established either by a common
cause in the common past or a direct influence from one event to the other. Bell’s
celebrated argument rules out the first possibility if that common cause is to
be a piece of classical information. Influence stories for establishing quantum
correlations cannot be ruled out entirely, but they require the speed of that
influence to be infinite, and they are unnatural in other respects expressing the
fact that explaining a non-signaling phenomenon with a signaling mechanism
is shooting sparrows with cannons. Eventually, the fundamentality of the causal
structure is in question2 — the only assumption for Reichenbach’s principle.
So motivated, models of relaxed causality have been studied [20] and disclosed
an unexpectedly rich world [3] between fixed causal orders and logical inconsis-
tency (à la “grandfather paradox” — you travel to the past and kill your own
grandfather — etc.), much like Bell world between locality and signaling.
The fall of rigid causality comes with a further victim, randomness: Common
physical definitions of freeness of randomness [9] are based on that very structure
and they fall with it. One way out is to consider freeness of randomness as
fundamental and causality as emerging from it, via: “What is correlated with a
perfectly free bit must be in its future.” For single bits, this is the best we can
hope for. For bit strings, however, there can be an intrinsic randomness notion
depending only on the data itself but not (otherwise) on the process leading
up to them. In our search for such a non-contextual view, we land in a field
traditionally related to probability distributions and ensembles but that knows a
“non-counterfactual” viewpoint as well: Thermodynamics.
2 From the Steam Pipe . . .
The story3 of the second law of thermodynamics starts with Sadi Carnot (1796–
1832) and his study of heat engines such as James Watt’s steam pipe. To
conclude that the law manifests itself only for such engines and their circular
processes means to underestimate a general combinatorial fact. The second law
was discovered through steam engines because they first permitted a precise
unclouded view on it — but the law is restricted to combustion engines as little
as Jupiter’s moons depend on telescopes.4
2 The idea of dropping causality may sound radical but is not new; see Bertrand
Russell, 1913 [22]: “The law of causality [. . . ] is a relic of a bygone age, surviving,
like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.”
3 Most of the following historical facts are drawn from the article “Bluff your way in
the second law of thermodynamics” by Jos Uffink, 2001.
4 A symptom of the law’s generality is that it has advanced to becoming pop culture
in the meantime: see, e.g., Allen, W., Husbands and Wives (1992) — The protagonist
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Carnot discovered that the maximal efficiency of a heat engine between two
heat baths depended solely on the two temperatures involved. This was his only
publication; it appeared when he was 28 and was entitled: “Réflexions sur la
puissance motrice du feu et sur les machines propres à développer cette puissance.”
Rudolf Clausius’ (1822–1888) version of the second law reads: “Es kann
nie Wärme aus einem kälteren in einen wärmeren Körper übergehen, ohne dass
eine andere damit zusammenhängende Änderung eintritt.” — “No process can
transport heat from cold to hot and do no further change.”
W. Thomson (Lord Kelvin) (1824–1907) formulated his own version of the
second law and then concluded that the law may have consequences more severe
than what is obvious at first sight: “Restoration of mechanical energy without
dissipation [...] is impossible. Within a finite period of time past, the earth must
have been, within a finite time, the earth must again be unfit for the habitation
of man.”
Also for Clausius, it was only a single thinking step from his version of the law
to conclude that all temperature differences in the entire universe will vanish —
the “Wärmetod” — and that then, no change will happen anymore. He speaks of
a general tendency of nature for change into a specific direction: “Wendet man
dieses auf das Weltall im Ganzen an, so gelangt man zu einer eigentümlichen
Schlussfolgerung, auf welche zuerst W. Thomson aufmerksam machte, nachdem
er sich meiner Auffassung des zweiten Hauptsatzes angeschlossen hatte.5 Wenn
[...] im Weltall die Wärme stets das Bestreben zeigt, [...] dass [...] Temperatur-
differenzen ausgeglichen werden, so muss es sich mehr und mehr dem Zustand
annähern, wo [...] keine Temperaturdifferenzen mehr existieren.” — “When this
is applied to the universe as a whole, one gets to the strange conclusion that
already W. Thomson had pointed out after having taken my view of the second
law. If heat always tends towards reducing temperature differences, then the
universe will approximate more and more the state in which no temperature
differences exist anymore.”6
Ludwig Boltzmann (1844–1906) brought our understanding of the second
law closer to combinatorics and probability theory: The second law was for
him the expression of the fact that it is more likely to end up in a large set of
possible states than in a small one: The higher the number of particular situations
(microstates) which belong to a general one (macrostate), the more likely it is to
be in that general situation. In other words, time evolution does not decrease a
Sally is explaining why her marriage did not work out. First she does not know,
then she realizes: “It’s the second law of thermodynamics: sooner or later, everything
turns to shit. That’s my phrasing, not the Encyclopedia Britannica.” The second law
is less popular than Einstein’s elegant relativity or Bennett et al.’s sexy teleportation
since it does not have any glamour, fascination, or promise attached to it: Quite on
the contrary, it stands for facts we usually deny or try to avoid.
5 Roughly: “He had an interesting view on the second law after having adopted mine.”
6 It seems that his faithful pupil Max Planck believed that claim was untenable —
Clausius finally erased, last-minute, all remarks concerning “the entropy of the
universe as a whole” from his collected works — by hand.
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closed system’s entropy, which is proportional to the logarithm of the number of
corresponding microstates: Things do not get “more special” with time.7
Boltzmann’s notions of macrostate and entropy are subjective, and it is not
obvious how to define them in general e.g., for non-equilibria. We propose instead
a version of the second law that is broader and more precise at the same time,
avoiding probabilities and ensembles. Crucial steps in that direction were made
by Wojciech Zurek [30]. We follow Rolf Landauer [18] whose choice of viewpoint
about thermodynamics can be compared with Ernst Specker ’s [23] about quantum
theory: Logic.
3 . . . to the Turing Machine
Landauer [18] investigated the thermodynamic price of logical operations. He
was correcting a belief by John von Neumann that every bit operation required
free energy kT ln 2:8 According to Landauer — as confirmed by Fredkin and
Toffoli’s [14] “ballistic computer” —, that price is unavoidable only for logically
irreversible operations such as the AND or the OR. On the positive side, it has
been observed [7] that every function, bijective or not, can in principle be evaluated
in a logically reversible way, using only “Toffoli gates,” i.e., made-reversible and
then-universal AND gates; this computation can then be thermodynamically
neutral, i.e., it does not dissipate heat.
Landauer’s principle states that the erasure (setting the corresponding binary
memory cells to 0) of N bits costs kTN ln 2 free energy which must be dissipated
as heat to the environment, a thermal bath of temperature T . The dissipation
is crucial in the argument: Heating up the environment compensates for the
loss of entropy within the memory cell which is materialized by some physical
system (spin, gas molecule, etc.). Landauer’s principle is a direct consequence of
Boltzmann’s view of the second law.
7 The corresponding formula S = k lnW is written in golden letters on Boltzmann’s
gravestone at the Zentralfriedhof — which is, as the word goes in Vienna, “halb
so gross und doppelt so lustig wie Zürich”. Boltzmann imagined that the universe
had started in a completely “uniform” state. So the diverse reality now perceived
would be a mere fluctuation. Note that the fact that this fluctuation is extremely
unlikely is irrelevant if you can condition on our existence, given your thinking all
this (this thought is sometimes called “the anthropic principle”). He was probably
aware that this way of thinking may lead into solipsism: “My existence alone, simply
imagining all that, is much more likely than the actual existence of all people around
me, let alone all the visible galaxies, etc.” He eventually hung himself in a hotel room
in Duino, Italy. It has been colported in Vienna that this may have been due to
“mobbing” at the university by Ernst Mach. Anyhow, today we prefer to comfort
ourselves with the contrary belief that the universe initiated in a low-entropy state,
and we call this assumption “the big bang.”
8 Here, k is Boltzmann’s constant connecting the micro- and macroscopic realms, T the
environmental temperature — and the factor ln 2 is a common sight at the border
between logic and physics with their respective basic constants 2 and e.
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Charles Bennett [8] used Landauer’s slogan “Information is Physical” for
making the key contribution to the resolution of the paradox of “Maxwell’s
demon” (see, e.g., [24]). That demon had been thought of as violating the second
law9 by adaptively handling a frictionless door with the goal of “sorting a gas” in
a container. Bennett took the demon’s memory (imagined to be in the all-0-state
before sorting) into account, which is in the end filled with “random” information
remembering the original state of the gas: The growth of disorder within the
demon compensates for the order she creates outside (i.e., in the gas) — the
second law is saved. The initial 0-string is the demon’s resource allowing for her
order creation (see Figure 1): If we break Bennett’s argument apart in the middle,
0110010101
1110010100
1101000101
0010100101
0101001000
1110101001
000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
0000000000
100010100
101000100
101101010
100101100
000101000
1111110101
gas brain
af
te
r
be
fo
re
Fig. 1. Bennett’s resolution of the Maxwell-demon paradox.
we end up with the converse of Landauer’s principle: The all-0-string has work
9 Also other authors noted the strange dependency of the law on the absence of certain
life forms — Kelvin wrote: “When light is absorbed other than in vegetation, there
is dissipation [...]”). To make things worse, there is always a non-zero probability
(exponentially small, though) of exceptions, where the law fails to hold; we are not
used to this from other laws of physics (outside quantum theory). This fragility of
the second law is weirdly contrasted by its being, at the same time, more robust
than others, such as Bell violations only realizable in extreme lab conditions: We
do not need to trust experimentalists to be convinced that “it” is there — in fact
everywhere.
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value, i.e., if we accept the respective memory cells to become “randomized,” we
can extract kTN ln 2 free energy from the environment (of temperature T ).
Already Bennett [7] had implied that for some strings S, the erasure cost is
less than Landauer’s len(S) ·kT ln 2: Besides the obvious 00 · · · 0 and 11 · · · 1, this
is also true, e.g., for the string formed by the first N digits of the binary expansion
of pi: The reason is that there is a short program generating the sequence or, in
other words, a logically reversible computation between (essentially) 0N and piN
that can be carried out thermodynamically reversibly [14]. Generally, if the string
can be compressed in a lossless fashion, then the erasure cost shrinks accordingly.
Let us consider a model for the erasure process (see Figure 2) in which there
is, besides the string S to be erased, another string X on the tape as a “catalyst”
summarizing possible a priori “knowledge” about S, so helping to compress it but
remaining itself unchanged in the process. The universal Turing machine U ’s tape
is assumed to be finite — there would be infinite “work value” on it otherwise —,
and the resulting erasure cost is ECU (S|X).
S U    X
U    X
reversible   compression
P 000..00
000..00
000..00
irreversible   erasure
U    X000............00 000..00
erasure cost: kT ln 2 len(P)
Fig. 2. Erasing S with catalyst X at cost ECU (S|X): First, X is reversibly compressed
to the shorter string P for free, then that “program” P is erased at cost kT ln 2 · len(P ).
Bennett [7] claims that the erasure cost of a string is, actually, its Kolmogorov
complexity times kT ln 2; this would in our model translate to the erasure cost
equalling the conditional complexity of the string to be erased, given the side
information: ECU (S|X) = KU (S|X). Unfortunately, this is in general not achiev-
able due to the uncomputability of Kolmogorov complexity and the corresponding
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compression transformation, and since we assume the extraction to be carried
out by a Turing machine, in the spirit of the Church/Turing hypothesis [16]. It is,
however, true that complexity leads to a lower bound on the erasure cost since it
represents the ultimate limit on the lossless compressibility of the string by U .
In the same way, we can argue that any concrete and computable compression
algorithm (with side information) C, e.g., Lempel/Ziv [29], leads to an upper
bound on the erasure cost: First, we reversibly compress (at no energy cost) and
then erase the compression.10
Landauer’s principle, revisited. Let C be a computable function,
C : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ ,
such that
(V,W ) 7→ (C(V,W ),W )
is injective. Then the cost of the erasure of S with catalyst X, carried out by the
universal Turing machine U , is bounded by
KU (S|X) · kT ln 2 ≤ ECU (S|X) ≤ len(C(S,X)) · kT ln 2 .
The principle can be extended to an arbitrary computation starting with
input A and leading up to output B with side information X, where (A,X)
and (B,X) are the only content of the tape, besides 0s, before and after the
computation, respectively. Our result is an algorithmically constructive modifi-
cation of entropic results [12] and a generalization of less constructive but also
complexity-based claims [31].
Landauer’s principle, generalized. Let C be a computable function,
C : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ ,
such that
(V,W ) 7→ (C(V,W ),W )
is injective. Assume that the Turing machine U carries out a computation such
that A and B are its initial and final states. Then the energy cost of this compu-
tation with side information X, CostU (A→ B |X), is at least
CostU (A→ B |X) ≥ [KU (A|X)− len(C(B,X))] · kT ln 2 .
10 Our result is in a certain contrast with claims by Dahlsten et al. [10] who take an
entropic stand: If a “demon” knows perfectly the string to be erased, this can be
done for free. In our algorithmic view, this is not reproduced for the case where that
knowledge is non-constructive, e.g., “S consists of the first N bits ΩN of the halting
probability Ω of U .” Given that particular knowledge, the entropy of S is zero, but
still it does not help for erasing S since no algorithm can generate or “uncompute” S
with the help of that knowledge. In contrast, as long as the knowledge is a copy of S
or a program that allows for computing S, the results of [10] and our own match.
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Proof. The erasure cost of A, givenX, is at leastKU (A|X)·kT ln 2 according to the
above. One possibility of realizing this complete erasure of A is to first transform
it to B (given X), and then erase B — at cost at most len(C(B,X)) · kT ln 2.
Therefore, the cost to get from A to B given X cannot be lower than the difference
between KU (A|X) · kT ln 2 and len(C(B,X)) · kT ln 2. qed.
The complexity reductions in these statements quantify the “amount of
logical irreversibility” inherent in the respective process, and the quantity of
required work — the price for this non-injectivity — is proportional to that. The
picture is now strangely hybrid: The environment must pay a thermodynamic
(macroscopic) price for what happens logically (microscopically) in one of its
parts. What prevents us from looking at the environment with a microscope? If
we let ourselves inspire by John Archibald Wheeler ’s [26] “It from Bit,” we see
the possibility of a compact argument: The price that the environment has to
pay in compensation for the irreversibility of the computation in one of its parts
is such that the overall computation is reversible.
Second law of Thermodynamics, logico-computational.
Time evolutions are logically reversible: No information gets erased.
Let us first note that this condition on time evolutions is, like traditional
“second laws,” asymmetric in time: Logical reversibility only requires the future
to uniquely determine the past, not vice versa: So if “reality” is such an injective
computation, its reverse can be injective as well (e.g., computation of a determin-
istic Turing machine, Everett/Bohm interpretation of quantum theory) or this
fails to hold since the forward direction has splitting paths (e.g., computation of
a probabilistic Turing machine).
The second law has often been linked to the emergence of an arrow of time.
How is that compatible with our view? In determinism, logical reversibility holds
both ways. What could then be possible origins of our ability to distinguish past
and future? (Is it the limited precision of our sense organs and the resulting coarse-
graining?) Indeterminism is easier in that sense since it comes with objective
asymmetry in time: Randomness points to the future.
4 Consequences
Logical reversibility implies quasi-monotonicity.
The logical reversibility of a computation implies that the overall complexity on
the Turing machine’s tape at time t can be smaller than the one at time 0 by
at most K(Ct) +O(1) if Ct is a string encoding the time span t. The reason is
that one possibility of describing the state at time 0 is to give the state at time t,
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plus t itself; the rest is exhaustive search using only a constant-length program
simulating forward time evolution.
Logical reversibility implies a Boltzmann-like second law.
The notion of a macrostate can be defined in an objective way, using a “structure”
function based on the Kolmogorov sufficient statistics [1], [4]. Roughly speaking,
the macrostate is the structure or “compressible part” of a microstate: Given the
macrostate — being a set of microstates that is, ideally, small, and its description
at the same time short (such as: “a gas of volume V , temperature T , and pres-
sure p in equilibrium”) —, the particular microstate is a “typical element” of it,
specifiable only through stubborn binary coding. This notion of a macrostate is
typically unrelated to the second law except when the initial and final macrostates
both have very short descriptions, like for equilibria: Then, logical reversibility
implies that their size is essentially non-decreasing in time. This is Boltzmann’s
law.
Logical reversibility implies a Clausius-like second law.
If we have a circuit — the time evolution — using only logically reversible Toffoli
gates, then it is impossible that this circuit computes a transformation of the
following nature: Any pair of strings — one with higher Hamming weight than
the other — is mapped to a pair of equally long strings where the heavy string
has become heavier and the light one lighter. Such a mapping, which accentuates
differences, cannot be injective for counting reasons. We illustrate this with a toy
example (see Figure 3).
Example. Let a circuit consisting of Toffoli gates map an N(= 2n)-bit string to
another string — which must then be N -bits long as well, due to reversibility.
We consider the map separately on the first and second halves of the full string.
We assume the computed function to be conservative, i.e., to leave the Hamming
weight of the full string unchanged. We look at the excess of 1’s in one of
the halves (which equals the deficit of 1’s in the other). We observe that the
probability (with respect to the uniform distribution over all strings of some
Hamming-weight couple (wn, (1−w)n)) of the imbalance substantially growing is
exponentially weak. The key ingredient in the argument is the function’s injectivity.
Explicitly, the probability that the weight couple goes from (wn, (1 − w)n) to
((w + ∆)n, (1 − w − ∆)n) — or more extremely —, for 1/2 ≤ w < 1 and
0 < ∆ ≤ 1− w, is(
n
(w+∆)n
)(
n
(1−w−∆)n
)(
n
wn
)(
n
(1−w)n
) = 2−Θ(n) :
Logical reversibility is incompatible with the tendency of polarization of differ-
ences.
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001000101000
000001000001
010001001000
100010000100
1110110111101
1110111111010
1011110111101
1111011111011
000000100000
000010000000
000000000010
010000000000
1111110111111
1111011111111
1111111110111
1111111111101
“cool” “cold”
“warm” “hot”
(not 
injective)
Fig. 3. Logical reversibility does not accentuate differences: Clausius.
Logical reversibility implies a Kelvin-like second law.
Finally, logical reversibility also implies statements resembling Kelvin’s version of
the second law: “A single heat bath alone has no work value.” This, again, follows
from a counting argument: There exists no reversible circuit that concentrates
redundancy to some pre-chosen bit positions.
Example. The probability that a fixed circuit maps a string of length N and
Hamming weight w to another such that the first n positions contain only 1’s,
and such that the Hamming weight of the remaining N − n positions is w− n, is(
N−n
w−n
)(
N
w
) = 2−Θ(n) .
In a sense, Kelvin’s law is a special case of Clausius’ formulation.
5 Epilogue
A priori, the relation between physical reality and computation is two-fold:
Turing’s famous machine model is physical — besides the tape’s infiniteness —,
and the generalized Church/Turing hypothesis suspects physical processes to
be simulatable on a Turing machine (see Figure 4). This circulus has been the
background of our considerations.
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physical
reality
information
processing
Church/Turing thesis
Turing-machine model
“Information is Physical”
(Landauer, 1961)
“It from Bit”
(Wheeler, 1989)
Fig. 4. Physics and information: Scenes from a marriage.
In the “Church/Turing view,” a physical law is a property of a Turing machine’s
computation: The second law of thermodynamics is logical reversibility.11
What can be said about the validity of the Church/Turing hypothesis? Nothing
absolute, just as on “determinism.” But exactly like for that latter problem, an
all-or-nothing statement creates, at least, a clear dichotomy [27], [2].
All-or-Nothing Feature of the Church/Turing Thesis.
Either no entity can generate non-Turing-computable sequences,
or even single photons can.
This results when we pursue the idea that Kolmogorov complexity measures
intrinsic randomness and apply it to Bell correlations: If we have access to some
“super-Turing machine,” we let that machine choose the particular measurement
11 The quantum-physical-interpretational reading thereof is the Everettian relative-
state view: In contrast to collapse interpretations, it is logically reversible due to its
unitarity. — There is a vivid dispute on such readings of quantum theory that is
sometimes more fiery than exact, more passionate than argumentational: The nature
of the debate is ignoring Paul Feyerabend’s remark that in science just as well as in
art, a particular style can merely be judged from the point of view of another, never
objectively. This call to modesty culminated in seeing science as one style among
many: “Man entscheidet sich für oder gegen die Wissenschaften genau so, wie man
sich für oder gegen punk rock entscheidet” [13].
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bases for the two parts of an entangled quantum system. The correlations then
imply the sequence of measured values to be Turing-uncomputable as well.
This analysis [28] resembles well-known arguments but replaces randomness
by complexity. The new approach has two conceptual advantages. The first is
its non-counterfactuality: We do not talk about the outcomes of unperformed
measurements. (Any Bell inequality does.) The second is context-independence:
No process-based notion of randomness is required. Such definitions are typically
embedded into a causal structure — but the non-local correlations themselves,
with their inexplicability by a “reasonable” mechanism within such a structure,
are among the strongest arguments against fundamental causality. The alternative
is to consider “free will” (randomness, if you will) as more fundamental and
causality as emerging from it through: “If Y is correlated with X, and X is freely
random, then Y must be in X’s future.” 12 Then the arrow of time appears as an
accumulation of irreversible binary decisions. The reverse transformation of such
splits is not logically reversible and, hence, violates the second law:
Logical Reversibility + Randomness = Thermodynamic Irreversibility .
This equation suggests how it comes that a law which we read here as reversibility
is often linked to the exact opposite.
12 Already in the early modern period there has been a vivid debate about the fun-
damentality of absolute spacetime, for which Newton was advocating; Leibniz, on
the other hand, rejected the notion as absurd and understood spacetime as merely
relational, emergent, and of logical nature. The corresponding debate [25] has been
decided by the course of history in favor of Newton — with certain exceptions,
notably Ernst Mach. We are not the only ones to suggest that the choice taken then
should be reconsidered today in the light of new insight.
Although Einstein’s relativity’s crystallization point was Mach’s principle — “iner-
tial forces are relational, and not with respect to absolute spacetime” — it does not
obey it: For Einstein, spacetime is fundamental and even in the massless universe,
there is the flat spacetime of special relativity. However, an inherent refutation of
rigidly causal thinking is contained in the field equations of general relativity —
having solutions in the form of closed spacetime curves [15]. When causality is
dropped, one risks antinomies. Ruling out the latter does, however, not throw us
back to causality [3]. This observation has recently been extended to computational
complexity [5]: Non-causal circuits avoiding antinomies are strictly stronger than
rigidly causal circuits.
The opposition between Newton and Leibniz can be seen as the modern version of
the tension between the thinking styles of the pre-Socratic philosophers Parmenides
and Heraclitus: For the former, all time and change are pure illusions, whereas
for the latter, only change is real: “You cannot step into the same river twice.”
Nietzsche [19] compared the “cold logician” Parmenides to ice, whereas Heraclitus is
the fiery physicist. The postmodern manifestation of the tension is the gap between
Landauer’s “Information is Physical” and Wheeler’s “It from Bit.” In this note, we
play on just that opposition for obtaining our reading of the second law.
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